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THE SIRENS' SONG: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Bradley A. Smith*
Listen with care
to this, now, and a god will arm your mind.
Square in your ship 's path are Seirenes, crying
beauty to bewitch men coasting by;
woe to the innocent who hears that sound,1
INTRODUCTION
After the elections of 1996, it is clear that the campaign finance
regulation system for federal elections is not working. At the
presidential level, the system is in danger of becoming a mockery.
Despite spending limits designed to keep campaign costs lower, it
is estimated that, upon final tally, some $800 million will actually
have been legally spent on the 1996 presidential race.2 At the con-
gressional level, parties, candidates and interest groups have learned
how to work around legal restrictions on contributions. The result
is an increasingly dishonest campaign in which advertisements
touting candidates are used for "party building," advertisements
intended to help elect or defeat candidates pretend not to advocate
such outcomes, and parties are forced to campaign independently
of their candidates.3
* The author is an Associate Professor of Law at Capital University Law
School and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute. B.A. Kalamazoo College;
J.D. Harvard Law School.
HoMER, THE ODYSSEY 210 (Book 12) (Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1963).
2 Center for Responsive Politics, Report on 1996 Elections (visited Oct. 17,
1996) <http://www.crp.org/1996elect/statemnt.html>.
' See Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elections Comm'n,
116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (holding that limits on political party spending in support
of candidates are unconstitutional, so long as parties spend the money indepen-
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Despite these problems, reform of the system is hardly a
foregone conclusion. First, there is no general consensus on what,
if anything, should be done. As Congress addresses the reform
issue in 1997, the most popular proposed measure calls for overall
limits on campaign spending.4 However, the Speaker of the House
has opined that more should be spent on campaigns.5 Such
differences of opinion are shaped, in part, by political
calculation-a strong barrier to change. It is relatively easy to
design campaign finance regulation so as to help one's friends and
hurt one's enemies.6 So long as each major party has sufficient
Senate votes to block reform through use of the filibuster, reforms
dently of the candidates' campaigns).
4 See H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997). The author will refer to this bill
by its popular name, Shays-Meehan, after its primary House sponsors. See also
S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997). The author will refer to this bill by its popular
name, McCain-Feingold, for its Senate sponsors. See James Bennett,
Congressmen Say President Will Push Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1997, at Al 8 (considering the status of the Shays-Meehan bill and the McCain-
Feingold bill, which are widely viewed as companion bills despite some
differences, as the primary legislative proposal in the 105th Congress). It may
seem ironic that the President, caught in a scandal over the financing of his 1996
campaign, should wholeheartedly endorse a campaign reform measure whose
primary Senate sponsor, John McCain, was a member of the so-called "Keating
Five," a group of United States senators involved in a fundraising scandal in the
late 1980s. See LARRY SABATO & GLENN SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS:
THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 8-9 (1996). Both
Senator McCain and President Clinton seem to blame "the system," rather than
personal failings, for their apparent willingness to trade official favor for
campaign donations. Both were easily re-elected to office.
' Editorial, Newt Gingrich, Copycat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at A16. In
the interest of full disclosure and blatant immodesty, the author notes that the
Wall Street Journal reported that in calling for still more political spending,
Speaker Gingrich was "following Mr. Smith." The Man Who Ruined Politics,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at A18 (the title of the editorial refers to former
Common Cause President Fred Werthheimer). Speaker Gingrich, of course, has
also been tripped up in finance scandals and reprimanded by the House of
Representatives for improperly using tax-exempt organizations to further his
campaign. See Adam Clymer, House, In 395-28 Vote, Reprimands Gingrich,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1997, at Al.
6 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of
All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 335 (1989).
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which disarm some groups while leaving others unscathed will
remain in limbo.
Further, looming over all debates about campaign finance
reform is the decision of the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.7
Buckley, to the dismay of reformers and the delight of civil
libertarians, has stood as an all but impregnable bulwark against the
most ambitious campaign finance reform schemes. The Court in
Buckley, under the rationale that only the actuality or appearance
of quidpro quo corruption is a sufficiently compelling government
interest to justify the First Amendment burdens of campaign
finance regulation,' struck down limits on campaign expenditures
made from personal wealth, limits on independent expenditures,
and restrictions on "issue advocacy." Buckley has proven such a
thorn in reformers' sides that many now seek to amend the
Constitution to overrule Buckley.9
The clamor for reform is great, at least in political circles."
But, as the title of this symposium asks, "[w]ill anything work?"
This question is asked with good reason, for this is not the first
time that the United States has faced an alleged "crisis" over
7 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
' See 424 U.S. at 26. The Court, in determining the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act, found that the primary purpose of the Act was
to prevent real or imagined corruption from large contributors and, as such,
justified a campaign contribution limitation of $1,000. Id. Even this rationale,
however, was limited in application. While the Court saw corruption, or the
appearance of corruption, as sufficient justification for the limitation of
individual campaign contributions, the Court did not believe that this was
sufficient justification for the limitation of independent campaign expenditures
(that is, expenditures on behalf of a candidate but unconnectedto the candidate's
campaign). Id. at 26-28, 45. Moreover, the Court did not believe this was a
sufficient justification for limiting the candidate's expenditure of his or her own
funds. Id. at 26-28, 45, 53. Indeed, according to the Court's rationale, personal
expenditures would reduce the probability of corruption. Id. at 53.
" The United States Senate, in a 61 to 38 vote, rejected a proposed
constitutional amendment on March 18, 1997. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Rejects
Campaign Finance Amendment, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1997, at B3.
"0 The broader public seems rather ambivalent about the whole matter. See
Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some Thoughts on Campaign
Reform and a Response to Professor Paul, CoNN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
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campaign finance." And, for those who remember Watergate, this
is not merely the second such "crisis."' 2 The question of campaign
reform has been addressed at regular intervals for nearly a century.
Nor is the current debate particularly unique, save for the sugges-
tion in some quarters that a constitutional amendment be adopted
to repeal the primary speech clauses of the First Amendment.'
3
Though the legislative battles have usually been long and hard,
after each such "crisis" of democracy our Congress has enacted a
new wave of legislation, or regulation, in an effort to purge the
political system of the allegedly "distorting" effects of money.'4
But, if what has been tried so far has failed to work, will anything
work? For the reasons set forth in Part II of this essay, I believe
not.
The problem with reform efforts is not merely that they do not
work. The greater problem is the long term threat they pose to
political liberty. With each new wave of campaign regulation,
society has been told that the corresponding sacrifices to political
freedom are small. Each wave of regulation, we have been
promised, will clean up the political system, return power to the
people and herald a bright new future for American political life.
Yet the promise is never fulfilled. After each reform measure, the
system has remained "corrupt" and "unequal." Indeed, it may have
become even more corrupt and unequal. However, each time we are
told that the situation could be remedied if we could plug a few
" See infra Section II and accompanying footnotes (providing a history of
campaign finance reform).
12 See infra Section II (discussing crises in campaign finance in the 1830's
and 1890's and steadily increasing spending levels throughout the twentieth
century).
13 See Wayne Berman, 12 Steps to Recovery: The G.O.P. 's Top Fund Raiser,
Wayne Berman Offers His Plan to Fix the System, TIME, July 14, 1997, at 44
(stating that some reform groups, such as the Common Cause, advocate positions
that would "gut" the Bill of Rights); Cindy Richards, Leading a Revolution by
Pen, Not Sword, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 1997, at 39 (indicating that former
Senator Bill Bradley advocates amending the United States Constitution to allow
federal, state and local governments to limit campaign spending).
14 See generally ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESSES, AND
COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw 1-53 (1988).
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more "loopholes" in the law.15 This promise-the promise of
"clean" elections, greater political equality and a return of power
to "the people"-is the Siren song of campaign finance. It is
pleasing to the ear and so we "crave to listen;"' 6 we long to turn
toward the sound. But like the song of the Sirens, which lured
many sailors before Odysseus to their doom, the song of campaign
finance reform is ultimately a path to the destruction of some of
our most cherished freedoms.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the goals of campaign
finance reform. Part II discusses the growth of political spending
in America and the history of campaign finance reform efforts.
This background having been established, Part III addresses the
question posed by this symposium: "Will anything work?" The
article concludes the answer must be "no," at least not if we value
our traditional freedoms of speech and political participation. And
because this is so, I suggest that, just as Odysseus had himself
bound to the mast of his ship so as to resist the Sirens' call, we
must bind ourselves to the First Amendment, lest we succumb to
the pleasing but dangerous calls of campaign finance reformers.
I. THE AIMS OF REFORM
While those seeking greater regulation of campaign finance
undoubtedly have varied and complex motives, their concerns may
generally be lumped into two categories: the prevention of
corruption and the promotion of equality. 7
IS See Jonathan Rauch, Campaign Finance: Blow It Up, NAT'L J., Mar. 29,
1997, at 604 (noting that the effort to "plug loopholes feeds mindlessly on
itself').
16 HOMER, supra note 1, at 216.
7 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976). Two other categories
might be suggested. The first is based on principles of good government
unrelated to equality or corruption concerns, such as Professor Blasi's concern
about the effect on Congress of the need to devote time to fundraising. See
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1281-83 (1994). However, as this problem is largely the
creation of past reform efforts limiting contributions in the name of equality and
anti-corruption, it would be easily alleviated by the repeal of existing regulations.
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Those who argue for campaign finance regulation in order to
prevent legislative corruption generally view campaign contribu-
tions as a form of legalized bribery, at worst, or a marked
constraint on a legislator's judgment and evaluation of issues, at
best. Professor Strauss 8 has summarized this view as one in
which "[c]andidates are 'bought' by their contributors and, in
carrying out the duties of their office, they respond to contributors'
wishes at the expense of other constituents and the public inter-
est."' 9 This fear of quid pro quo corruption seems to dominate
most press reports, and corruption is also the central concern of the
three highly publicized campaign finance exposes of the 1980s, as
illustrated by their respective titles: Elizabeth Drew's Politics and
Money: The New Road to Corruption;20 Brooks Jackson's Honest
Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process;2' and
Philip Stem's The Best Congress Money Can Buy.22 This was also
the type of "corruption" the Supreme Court seemed to have in
mind when it upheld limits on contributions to candidates in
Buckley. 3
The second additional concern would be the potential for extortion of the private
sector by government officials. David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign
Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 152 (1995). This concern is the
flip side of the usual anti-corruption argument. Although it was once viewed as
the most powerful argument for reform, it now is rarely mentioned by those
seeking greater regulation, and so the author does not list it separately here.
S David A. Strauss is the Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law at the University
of Chicago.
'9 Strauss, supra note 17, at 143.
20 ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO
CORRUPTION (1983). Ms. Drew opens her book by arguing that the need for
campaign funds leads candidates to "adjust their behavior in office to the need
for money." Id. at 1.
21 BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PROCESS (1988). After an introductory chapter on the mechanics of
raising money, Mr. Jackson begins his assault on political contributors with a
story of outright, and clearly illegal, bribery. Id. at 29-30.
22 PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BuY (1988).
23 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) ("To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy
is undermined.") (emphasis added).
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The second concern is one of political equality. Here the
argument is that equality at the voting booth is not adequate; rather,
citizens must be equal at earlier stages of the political process. 4
The greatest perceived inequality, in these earlier stages, is
monetary inequality.25 Asserting that the democratic norm of "one
person/one vote" is not met merely by an equal vote at the end of
the campaign, reformers argue that efforts must be made to enhance
the voices of some, or silence others, to assure some degree of true
equality. 6 Although this view is not particularly prevalent in
" See Edward B. Foley, Equal Dollars-Per- Voter: A Constitutional Principle
of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (proposing that
each voter should have "equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or
opposing any candidate or initiative on the ballot in any election held within the
United States").
25 See, e.g., id. (stating that wealthy citizens should not have greater
participation in political decisions simply because of their greater wealth). See
also David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez Faire in
Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236, 236-37 (1991) (discussing
the way capitalism and a free market system conflict with and restrict democ-
racy).
26 See Cole, supra note 25, at 236, 243-44; Foley, supra note 24, at 1212-13,
1225-26. Some have gone so far as to argue that anti-corruption concerns are, in
fact, also equality concerns. In essence, the argument contends, public officials
should be responsive to the wishes of their constituents. Campaign contributions
are a method by which citizens attempt to ensure that officials are responsive.
Furthermore, assuming that contributions are truly spent on the campaign, and
not for the personal enrichment of the candidate, they in many ways fill this role
more effectively than votes. Constituents may register the intensity of their
preferences with the size of their contributions and may also divide their
contributions based on the extent to which they agree with the many policy
positions of a given candidate. A vote, on the other hand, cannot be so divided
to reflect any degree of agreement or intensity. Thus, contributions may indeed
influence legislative decisions, but this is not necessarily bad. The problem is not
that contributions are corrupting, but that the ability to make them is not equal.
Some citizens have a better opportunity than others to purchase, if you will,
policy outcomes. If, however, all citizens had equal means, the potentially
corrupting effects of contributions would not be a problem. See, e.g., Richard L.
Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian Defense of Campaign
Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1996); Strauss, supra note 17, at 142-45.
This view is vigorously, and, I think correctly, disputed by Professor Loewnstein.
See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption:
Comments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 165-74 (1995).
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society-at-large, it enjoys a substantial popularity in legal aca-
demia.27
Of course, many argue that reform is needed for both anti-
corruption and equality purposes, and the issues are closely
linked. 28 The question that must be asked is whether either goal
can be met within the constraints of a society in which people are
free to speak and to participate in political activity. Answering this
question first requires a brief history of campaign spending and
reform efforts.
II. A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND REFORM
A. The Growth of Campaign Spending
In the colonial period and early years of the Republic, campaign
finance was not an issue. In fact, most offices were not elective.
Those that were frequently went uncontested and such elections as
were held involved small electorates of propertied white men.29 In
George Washington's first bid for the Virginia House of Burgesses
27 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
THE MODERN STATE 255 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Richard L.
Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy:An Egalitarian Public Choice Defense
of Campaign Finance Ventures, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Frederick Schauer,
The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935
(1993); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse ofAmerican Politics, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Oct. 17, 1996, at 19.
Neither concern, of course, is exclusively the province of one group. For
example, Professor Lowenstein, one of the foremost academic writers, has made
the prevention of corruption the centerpiece of several articles. See Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on Strauss and
Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163 (1995); Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 301;
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985). At the same time, the populist writer
Philip Stem includes equality concerns in his litany of complaints. STERN, supra
note 22, at 4-5.
28 See, e.g., STERN, supra note 22, at 4-5; Strauss, supra note 17, at 143.
29 See ROBERT J. DINKIN, CAMPAIGNING IN AMERICA 1-30 (1989); GEORGE
THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? 25 (1973).
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30in 1757, for example, there were only 391 eligible voters.
Washington spent thirty-nine pounds to buy "treats" for voters.
In those early days, such campaign expenses as existed were
typically paid from the candidate's own pocket, and went for food
and drink, or the occasional pamphlet or piece of campaign
literature.32
By the last decade of the eighteenth century, the rudiments of
a party system were beginning to evolve, and both Federalist and
Republican interests turned to newspapers as a primary mechanism
for political campaigning. Both sides subsidized partisan editors and
publications, and arranged for copies of newspapers to be distrib-
uted free of charge.33 Partisan pamphlets, or "circulars," were
widely distributed in an effort to reach voters.34 From these early
beginnings, campaign expenditures have grown steadily for most of
the nation's history.3
5
By the 1830s, congressional races typically cost $3,000 to
$4,000.36 The 1830 gubernatorial race in Kentucky was estimated
to cost $10,000 to $15,000, 37 the equivalent of over $200,000
today.38 The United States Bank spent approximately $42,000
between 1830 and 1832 on literature and advertisements intended,
in large part, to help defeat President Andrew Jackson in the
30 THAYER, supra note 29, at 25.
31 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 3.
32 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 3-4.
33 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, &
POLITICAL REFORM 77 (1992); DINKIN, supra note 29, at 14-16.
34 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 14. Thomas Jefferson spent considerable sums
publishing partisan tracts, and also raised money from Philadelphia citizens to
support pro-Republican newspapers. THAYER, supra note 29, at 26.
31 See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text (providing a brief history of
campaign finance expenditures).
36 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 40.
37 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 40.
3' Throughout this article, the author has converted nominal expenditures to
current dollars using a consumer price index (CPI) converter developed by
Oregon State University Professor Robert Sahr. It is located on the Internet at
<http://www.orst.edu/dept/polsci/sahr/cpi96.html>. Sources cited throughout the
text list amounts in nominal dollars; all conversions to current dollars were made
by the author, using Professor Sahr's chart.
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election of 1832.39 In the presidential election of 1860, supporters
of Abraham Lincoln reportedly spent some $100,000, while Ulysses
S. Grant's winning campaign of 1872 cost approximately
$250,000.40 Just four years later, in 1876, Republican Rutherford
B. Hayes and Democrat Samuel J. Tilden each spent over $900,000
or more than $11 million in current dollars.4'
Costs again exploded in the 1890s. In 1892, Chicago mayoral
candidate Carter Henry Harrison reportedly spent $500,000
(approximately $8.5 million today),42 while a Chicago alderman
candidate in 1895 raised a campaign fund of $100,000. 4' Then, in
the presidential election of 1896, Republican National Chair Mark
Hanna systematized fundraising to an unprecedented level and
raised as much as $7 million (equivalent to approximately $140
million today) to support the campaign of William McKinley. 4
This amount would not be reached again, even in nominal dollars,
until 1936. 4' Hanna raised much of this money from corporations
and banks,46 but large individual donors also became increasingly
important in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For
example, in 1904 Democratic candidate Alton B. Parker received
approximately $700,000 from longtime party supporters August
Belmont Jr. and Thomas Fortune Ryan.4 7 At about the same time,
to satisfy the monetary demands of campaigning, both parties made
major efforts to attract money from small donors, with mixed
success.
48
9 THAYER, supra note 29, at 29.
40 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 80, Table 5-1. President Lincoln himself
spent some $400 in 1860 to subsidize a Republican newspaper in Illinois.
ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 80.
4' ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 80, Table 5-1. Tilden had been a major
Democratic party donor in earlier campaigns, contributing $10,000 to the 1868
campaign (the equivalent of over $100,000 today). THAYER, supra note 29, at 35.
42 THAYER, supra note 29, at 40.
43 THAYER, supra note 29, at 42. The candidate, "Hinky Dink" Kenna, lost
in part because his campaign kitty was stolen. THAYER, supra note 29, at 42.
4 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 106.
41 See ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 80, Table 5-1.
46 MUTCH, supra note 14, at xvii.
4' DINKIN, supra note 29, at 106.
4' DINKIN, supra note 29, at 107.
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Spending crept up only gradually from the turn of the century
through the 1940s, dampened in part by the Great Depression and
World War II, which naturally limited the resources that could be
spent on political activity.49 In inflation adjusted dollars, combined
Republican and Democratic spending in the 1948 presidential
election was the lowest since 18800
However, in 1952 yet another wave of spending growth
began,5' that has continued, more or less unabated, to the present.
Combined political spending at the local, state, and federal levels
has since grown steadily from $140 million for the two year
election cycle of 1951-52, to $200 million in 1963-64, to $540
million in 1975-76, to $1.2 billion in 1979-80, to $2.7 billion in
1988-89, and finally, to 3.5 billion in 1991-92.2 For many, this
spending growth is alarming in and of itself. Reform advocacy
groups such as Common Cause, the League of Women Voters and
the Center for Responsive Politics regularly put out breathless press
releases on the steady growth of campaign spending. 3 Such alarm
" See ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 80, Table 5-1.
'0 See ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 80, Table 5-1.
-" ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 79. Significantly, in 1952 a government
freeze on new television stations ended. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 79.
52 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 82, Table 5-2; HERBERT E. ALEXANDER
& ANTHONY CORRADO, FINANCING THE 1992 ELECTION 1 (1995).
11 FRANK SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 25
(1992). Common Cause is a self-described nonpartisan, citizens' lobby that
advocates campaign finance reform. The organization has 250,000 members and
has "waged war against the undue power of money and speech interests in
politics for 25 years." Kirk Victor, Lobbying: Lost Cause?, NAT'L J., Mar. 1,
1997, at 410. The League of Women Voters describes itself as "a nonpartisan
organization that works to promote political responsibility through active
informed participation of all citizens in their government." League of Women
Voters, Voters Guide Local Elections Saturday, May 3, 1997, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 21, 1997, at 2.
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is not uncommon in academic writing on the subject.54 Therefore,
it may be beneficial to review the reasons for spending growth.
B. The Reasons for the Steady Growth of Spending
There is no doubt that campaign spending has increased over
the past 200 years in both "real" and nominal dollars." However,
it is worth noting that spending growth may be overstated because,
until the last half century, much political spending was all but
untrackable. Thus, early estimates are unreliable and probably
understated.56 If early spending was higher than most published
estimates, and there is reason to believe this is so, then spending
has not increased as much as the published figures show.
Whatever the actual increase, much of that increase is due to
ordinary, mundane factors. The most obvious, of course, is general
inflation." One dollar in 1900, adjusted for inflation, is the
equivalent of approximately twenty dollars today. In recent years,
" See generally Charles D. Fervis & L. Gregory Ballard, Independent
Political Action Groups: New Life for the Fairness Doctrine, 36 VAND. L. REV.
929 (1983); Michael J. Garrison, Corporate PoliticalSpeech, Corporate Spending
and First Amendment Doctrine, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 163 (1989); Fred Wertheimer
& Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the
Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1132-33 (1994); Adam S.
Tanenbaum, Comment, Day v. Holahan: Crossroads in Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence, 84 GEO L.J. 151 (1995).
" See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text (detailing historical
increases in campaign finance expenditures).
56 As an example of this unreliability, George Thayer points out that most
scholars believe the total cost of James Buchanan's 1856 presidential campaign
was approximately $25,000; yet one prominent Democrat of the time stated that
Buchanan's victory was helped by spending $50,000 more than his Republican
opponent, John Fremont. THAYER, supra note 29, at 31.
"7 See ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 79. Campaign costs began to rise
rapidly with the elections in 1952, the year in which new television stations were
permitted to operate. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 79. By 1956, commercial
stations had quadrupled in number. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 79. The
history of radio and television in political campaigns is further discussed in
Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Presidential Campaigns, in HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1789-1968, 3873 (Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr. & Fred L. Israel eds., 1971).
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prices for such indispensable campaign expenses as paper, postage
and advertising have risen faster than general inflation,5" so one
would expect political spending to rise at a rate faster than the
general inflation rate.
A second reason for the general growth of campaign expendi-
tures is the growth of the electorate. The few dozen pounds which
George Washington spent on his 1757 campaign for the Virginia
House of Burgesses, a race with just 391 eligible voters, would
amount to over two dollars per eligible voter in 1996 dollars.
Today, many, if not most, races involving small electorates are
conducted for less money, suggesting that much of the spending
growth in congressional and legislative races is due to larger
electorates.
Pure population growth has played a significant role in the
growth of the electorate. However, the electorate has grown at a
faster rate than the populace, for reasons which most people quite
rightly favor. In most states, early elections were limited to white,
male property owners. 59 This began to change during the early-
nineteenth century and accelerated through the Jacksonian era.6"
States gradually dropped religious and property qualifications for
voting. 61 The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution eliminated
formal bans on voting based explicitly on race.62 The Nineteenth
Amendment enfranchised women 63  and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment gave eighteen year-olds the right to vote.64 Statutory
changes have also expanded the franchise. Especially notable is the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, a stunning success in eliminating legal
58 See DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE 63
(1990) (reporting that the price of postage and television advertising doubled
from 1982 to 1988; the cost of paper also increased "dramatically"). General
price inflation over the same period was approximately 20 percent. See Sahr,
supra note 38.
'9 THAYER, supra note 29, at 24.
60 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 30 (1945).
61 THAYER, supra note 29, at 28. See generally CHILTON WILLIAMSON,
AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760-1860 (1960).
62 U.S. CONST. amend. XV (ratified in 1870).
63 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (ratified in 1920).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (ratified in 1971).
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barriers to black voter registration in the South.65 The Supreme
Court also expanded the electorate, through a series of decisions
striking down "grandfather clauses, ,66 whites-only primary
elections, 67 bans on voting by citizens in the military,68 poll
taxes69 and unduly long residency requirements.70 Thus, candi-
dates today are required to reach a far greater number of voters
than their predecessors.
These larger electorates make it less likely that a candidate will
personally know a substantial percentage of the electorate, making
increased advertising necessary to inform voters about the candi-
dates. Thus, the larger electorate not only increases total advertising
expenditures, but also increases expenditures on a per voter basis
as well. In fact, the amount spent per voter is considerably higher
than in our nation's early days. Yet, over the past twenty years, a
period marked by great concern over political spending, the amount
spent per eligible voter has remained quite stable.7 On a per voter
basis, political spending in the United States remains lower than in
many other democracies, some of which are considerably poorer.72
6S See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 21 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992).
66 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 355 (1915).
67 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (striking down an internal
party rule limiting voting in primary elections to white voters); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (striking down a state statute limiting voting
in primary elections to whites).
61 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
69 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
70 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
7' For example, since 1972, after the Votings Rights Act and the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment greatly expanded the electorate, the amount spent per eligible
voter in congressional races, in constant dollars, has hovered in a range from
approximately $2.50 per eligible voter to $3.50 per eligible voter, inching up
slightly in the highly competitive elections of 1994 and 1996. See FILIP PALDA,
How MUCH IS YOUR VOTE WORTH? 9-10 (1994) (analyzing data from 1972-
1992). Early 1996 numbers indicated that about $800 million was spent on
congressional races, or about four dollars per eligible voter. Center for
Responsive Politics, supra note 2.
72 MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 58, at 43 (noting that Venezuela, West
Germany, Israel, and Ireland spend more per voter than the United States).
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Not only has the electorate grown, but the number of political
offices which are filled by popular election is significantly higher
today than in the early days of the republic. A majority of offices
were appointed in colonial America; only after the Constitution was
ratified did states gradually shift to popular elections.73
Notwithstanding, a majority of states did not provide for popular
election of presidential electors.7 4 Subsequently, spending on
political activity has risen with the number of offices up for
election.
A third factor in the long increase in spending is the gradual
democratization of campaign methods. Early campaigns were
fought out primarily through highly partisan newspapers and
circulars.75 The campaign of 1840 is notable for the first large
scale use of buttons, banners, parades and memorabilia.76 In 1860
Stephan Douglas became the first presidential candidate to
campaign extensively in person, but personal campaigning remained
rare until well into the present century.77 This more intensive style
of campaigning gave voters more direct exposure to the candidates
and created an atmosphere in which candidates were, and to this
day are, expected to communicate directly to voters. Thus,
campaign costs began to rise long before the advent of radio and
television, forms of mass communication that later drove costs even
higher. By 1928 nearly twenty percent of the Democratic National
Committee's budget went to bring presidential candidate Al Smith's
"' DINKIN, supra note 29, at 11; THAYER, supra note 29, at 28 (noting
change from appointed to elective offices beginning in the 1830s).
7' THAYER, supra note 29, at 24-25.
" See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (noting the increased use
of newspapers and pamphlets).
76 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 78; DINKIN, supra note 29, at 49-53. This
trend had begun in the elections of 1828, 1832 and 1836. See NATHAN MILLER,
STEALING FROM AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CORRUPTION FROM JAMESTOWN TO
REAGAN 116-17 (1992).
" ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 78. After Douglas, personal campaigning
was again eschewed until the candidacy of William Jennings Bryan in 1896.
ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 78. Subsequently, advertising and modem
"merchandise" campaigning gradually began to dominate. See generally DINKIN,
supra note 33, at 95-198.
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voice "into every home in the United States., 78 By the election of
1952, television had become as important to candidates as radio,
and by the mid-1960s, most Americans relied on television as their
primary news source. 79 Today, a candidate in a closely contested
congressional campaign will spend one-half to three-quarters of his
or her budget on television advertising.80
Another new expense which has driven up campaign costs is the
cost of compliance with campaign finance regulations. Since the
1970s, candidates for federal office, and in many states for state
and local offices, have faced substantial legal obligations to track
and report on contributions and expenditures. This has created
accounting, reporting and legal expenses which were unheard of in
earlier days.81 Meanwhile, limitations on the size of contributions
have raised the administrative cost of raising the money.
In addition to the factors that have directly raised the cost of
campaigning, campaign spending has grown because the supply of
available funds has increased. The ability and desire to spend
" ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 82 (quoting LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY
IN ELECTIONS 28 (1932)).
7 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 167.
'o MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 58, at 62. However, while there is no
denying that the need to advertise on television has added to the costs of
campaigning, the increase is not, on the whole, nearly so great as these figures
may make it seem. As Alexander argues, most candidates for local office do not
use television. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 85. Indeed, "only serious
candidates for major offices-presidential, senatorial, gubernatorial, and mayoral
in big cities-make substantial use of television advertisements." ALEXANDER,
supra note 33, at 85.
"I For example, in the presidential election of 1992, the two major parties
spent $11 million on compliance costs, or roughly ten percent of their total
campaign budgets. ALEXANDER & CORRADO, supra note 52, at 127. The parties
were each given $55.2 million in public funding to finance the general election.
Compliance funds may be raised separately from that amount. It has been argued
that these funds are used for regular campaign activity, not mere compliance.
ALEXANDER & CORRADO, supra note 52, at 126-27 (noting post election
complaints filed with the Federal Elections Commission by the Center for
Responsive Politics). However, the $11 million figure does not include
substantial compliance costs by defeated presidential primary candidates, nor, of
course, for thousands of other federal, state and local offices which are subject
to various campaign finance laws. See generally PALDA, supra note 71, at 20-23.
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money on political activity is lower when the material standard of
living is lower. As the standard of living improves, more money is
available for non-essentials, such as politics. As a society becomes
richer, it is likely to have more discretionary income that may be
put toward political activity Nevertheless, the amounts spent on
political activity in the United States remain trivial, whether
considered as a percentage of gross domestic product,82 or in
comparison to other types of advertising.83 This alone suggests
that spending will continue to rise.
Finally, there is one last factor that has contributed mightily to
the growth of political spending: the growth of government.8 4 The
more power the government has to bestow benefits on the popu-
lace, or to regulate human endeavors, the greater the incentive for
citizens to attempt to influence the government and the election of
government office holders. According to studies by University of
Chicago economist John Lott, eighty seven percent of the increase
in federal campaign spending between 1976 and 1994 can be
attributed to rising federal government expenditures.85 Similarly
most of the spending growth in state legislative and gubernatorial
races can be explained by increases in state spending. 6 This is, I
think, only common sense. When the federal government claims the
power to nationalize whole industries, such as health care; threatens
to use its powers in an effort to destroy a long-standing legal
industry, such as tobacco;87 spends over $1 trillion per year;
82 We now spend approximately 0.05% to 0.06% of gross domestic product
on political activity, an increase from 0.03% in 1968. Robert J. Samuelson, The
Price of Politics, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 1995, at 65.
" See, e.g., ALEXANDER & CORRADO, supra note 52, at 3-4; MAGLEBY &
NELSON, supra note 58, at 40-41; Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049,
1059-60 (1996).
84 PALDA, supra note 71, at 96 (noting that political spending has risen at
roughly the same rate as governmental expenditures).
85 John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures
are Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger, 8 (1996) (paper on file with
author).
86 Id. at 17-19.
87 In 1995, President Clinton authorized the FDA to regulate the tobacco
industry's advertising that targets children. See Union Leaders Criticize Clinton's
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redistributes income freely to politically favored groups; and
regulates virtually all aspects of human endeavor, it is only natural
that groups and individuals will find it worthwhile to spend large
sums in an effort to influence who holds office. 8
Of all the reasons for the growth of spending, this last may be
the most important, because it is the one factor directly dependent
upon government policies in other areas. Thus, Lott's studies have
the most important implications for reform efforts. For those most
concerned about corruption, Lott's work suggests that if efforts to
block legal expenditures are not accompanied by a reduction in the
size of government, they may simply result in increases of illegal
and undisclosed activities. This conclusion suggests that disclosure,
and disclosure alone, is the appropriate solution to concerns about
corruption. Disclosure allows both individuals and groups to fulfill
their desire to participate freely in the system. Although some may
still want to hide their activity, doing so becomes the difference
between legal action and illegal activities. Because the basic desire
to participate may be fulfilled legally, so long as contributions are
disclosed, most contributors and candidates will comply with
disclosure requirements.89 Disclosure, in turn, provides voters with
information that should deter improper legislative behavior.
This link between the growth of government and campaign
spending poses an even greater dilemma for equality minded
reformers. Many of those who urge campaign finance on equality
grounds also favor redistribution of wealth and an activist govern-
Anti-Smoking Plan, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL
6619256. This new policy has been identified as the beginning of an effort to
regulate and destroy the tobacco industry. See id.
88 See Richard Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 41, 56 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds.,
1992); Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1258, 1265-66 (1994).
89 Disclosure is not without its problems, as it can have a chilling effect on
speech. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995);
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 191 (1982);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). It also smothers speech by
subjecting small players to heavy regulation. For this reason, some have
suggested that disclosure levels should be set at a relatively high level. SABATO
& SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 332.
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ment to assure economic equality.9 To this extent, their efforts on
the economic front will encourage more spending in the political
arena. This, in turn, suggests that ever harsher regulatory measures
will be required to achieve the desired political equality.
Given this relationship between government power and
campaign expenditures, it is no surprise that the pressure for
campaign finance reform began with the growth of government
witnessed in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
C. Past Efforts At Reform
The story of reform is one of repeated efforts to limit private
attempts to influence government policy, while still promoting an
activist government in economic and social policy. Each reform
effort has been designed to close "loopholes" left open by past
reforms. Time and again, the effort has failed.
Campaign financing was unregulated through the nation's first
century. Early on a few states unsuccessfully attempted to limit the
practice of providing voters with food and drink, without much
success.91 Candidates and their parties were left unregulated in
their attempts to raise funds. One early form of raising money was
to assess officeholders a percentage of their salary as a condition
of retaining office.92 A bill was introduced to stop this practice as
early as 1839, but it was not until after the assassination of
President Garfield by a disgruntled office seeker that the Pendleton
90 See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1160, 1163-64, 1179-80, 1185, 1203 (1994); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal
Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 275 n.12,
301 (1993).
91 Some states had laws against offering "Victuals, Drink or other
Consideration" before an election, but these laws were rarely enforced. DINKIN,
supra note 29, at 13 (quoting Charles S. Sydnor, GENTLEMEN FREEHOLDERS 55
(1952)). These laws did not regulate contributions to candidates or total spending
by candidates, but merely prohibited offering items that might be considered
bribes for votes.
92 DINKIN, supra note 29, at 40, 73; MUTCH, supra note 14, at xvi.
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Act 93 created a civil service, 94 and made it a crime for a federal
employee to solicit funds from another federal worker.
Although the Pendleton Act is often considered the first
campaign finance bill, 95 the motivation for the bill was the
opposite of later efforts at reform. By limiting the ability of
officeholders to extract contributions from those they appointed to
office, civil service reform sought not to protect legislators or the
government from the corrupting influence of contributions, but to
protect government employees from the power of government
officials. From the viewpoint of modern concerns regarding
corruption and equality, a system of finance based on assessments
of party officeholders seems a benign, or even a positive
idea-campaigns are financed by small contributors who care most
about electoral outcomes, and there is no serious danger of quid
pro quo corruption, at least in policy making decisions, if not in
staffing decisions.
The earliest laws resembling present day campaign finance
reform laws were passed in the 1890s, when Nebraska, Missouri,
Tennessee and Florida banned corporate contributions.96
Significantly, each of these states had voted for William Jennings
Bryan in the presidential election of 1896. The bans on corporate
contributions were, in large part, an effort to retaliate for corporate
support of Bryan's opponent, William McKinley.97
The federal government did not become involved in campaign
finance for another decade. Ironically, what finally triggered federal
reform was an unrelated state investigation into insurance industry
practices. In 1905, the state of New York held a legislative inquiry
into the financial practices of the Equitable Life Insurance
Company. During the investigation, it was revealed that the
" 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codifiedas amendedat 5 U.S.C. §1101-1501 (1994);
40 U.S.C. § 42 (1994)).
94 MUTCH, supra note 14, at xvi.
9' SeeCONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCES:
HISTORY, FACTS AND CONTROVERSY 30 (1992); ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at
24; MUTCH, supra note 14, at xvi.
96 MUTCH, supra note 14, at xvii.
9' MUTCH, supra note 14, at xvii.
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company had made large contributions to the Republican Party.98
Though corporate support for Republicans was well known, the
Equitable investigation took on an air of scandal, leading to the
first federal campaign finance bill. This bill, passed in 1907,
banned campaign contributions or spending by federally chartered
banks and corporations. The bill's chief sponsor, Senator
"Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, argued, much as reformers do today, that
the American people believed Congress had become the "instru-
mentalities and agents of corporations." 99
Subsequently, in 1910, passage of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act required the disclosure, in House races, of each contributor of
$100 or more, approximately $1,667 today, and of each recipient
of $10 or more. This procedure was extended to include Senate
races the next year. The 1911 measure also limited the amount that
could be spent in Senate races to $10,000 and House races to
$5,000, i° approximately $166,667 and $83,333 by today's
standards. However, these spending limits had little effect because
they applied only to the candidate, not to committees operating
without the candidate's involvement.1 ' Thus, the spending limits
were easily evaded through the simple expedient of the candidate's
"discreet ignorance."' 0
2
In 1925, in the wake of the Teapot Dome scandal,'0 3
Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act." The Act
attempted to close "loopholes" in the law by extending the ban on
98 MUTCH, supra note 14, at 2-3.
99 MUTCH, supra note 14, at 6.
... CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 95, at 31.
101 See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 292-93 (1921).
102 MUTCH, supra note 14, at 22 (quoting LouiSE OVERACKER, MONEY IN
ELECTIONS 271 (1932)).
'03 The Teapot Dome Scandal, 1921-1922, involved President Harding's
Secretary of the Interior, Albert Fall, accepting bribes to lease government lands
to oil companies. 2 MARY BETH NORTON ET AL., A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 722 (4th ed. 1994). Additionally, one oil
developer gave money to the Republican Party during an "off election" year so
that the contribution escaped disclosure requirements. Jennifer A. Moore, Note,
Campaign Finance Reform in Kentucky: The Racefor Governor, 85 KY. L.J. 723
(1996-97).
104 2 U.S.C. §256 (1925) (repealed 1972).
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corporate participation to include all corporate contributions.
Additionally, it required disclosure of receipts and expenditures for
candidates to the House and Senate, including contributions made
outside an election year, and required disclosure of contributions
and expenditures by any committee operating in two or more
states.105 However, the Act was still interpreted as limiting
disclosure to personal, but not committee, expenditures." 6 By
establishing numerous committees, each operating in just one state,
national contribution and expenditure limits were easily evaded.
Furthermore, the disclosure provision lacked an enforcement
mechanism and had no provision to correct errors.0 7
The 1930s witnessed a new wave of reform as Republicans and
conservative Southern Democrats became increasingly concerned
that New Deal programs might be used to unduly influence voting.
Specifically, it was alleged that government employees in the
Works Progress Administration were being forced to make
campaign contributions.'0" Therefore, the Hatch Act was passed
in 1939, extending the ban on political contributions to include any
government employee. Unlike the earlier Pendleton Act, which
aimed to protect citizens from government exploitation, the Hatch
Act was intended to strike directly at Democratic Party funding and
Franklin Roosevelt's political power.0 9
In 1940, the Hatch Act was expanded to include a ban on
donations by federal contractors or by employees of state agencies
financed in whole or in part by the federal government."0
Additionally, contributions to any committee were limited to
$5,000."' In 1943, fearful that excess union power might damage
the war effort, Congress passed the Smith-Connally Act,"2
1o5 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 25-26.
'06 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 25-26.
107 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 25-26.
108 THAYER, supra note 29, at 71.
109 MUTCH, supra note 14, at 33.
110 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 95, at 33.
..' ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 25. However, this restriction was easily
avoided by donating to multiple committees. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 34.
",2 Smith-Connally Anti Strike Act (War Labor Disputes Act), ch. 144, 57
Stat. 163 (1943) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1501 - 1511 (1997), repealedby
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temporarily prohibiting labor unions from contributing to cam-
paigns. This ban was made permanent four years later under the
Taft-Hartley Act. " 3 However, unions circumvented this latest ban
by establishing the first political action committees, or PACs, that
collected money through automatic payroll check-offs.
114
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and even into the early 1970s,
efforts were made to pass various "clean elections" bills." 5 As
usual, complaints were voiced that money has made "some citizens
more equal than others," and that the political process had become
"corrupt."'' 1 6 Restrictions on spending and contributions were
needed because "radio and television advertising require millions
of dollars."'1 7 Similar previous efforts to limit contributions and
spending had been largely evaded through the exploitation of what
would today be called "loopholes." Thus began a push for
legislation that would be more heavy-handed, and subsequently
more effective, than prior reform efforts. This push, helped along
by the Watergate scandal, led to major reform in 1971, and
especially, 1974.
The Federal Election Campaigns Act,"8 ("FECA"),was passed
in 1971, replacing the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act." 9 It
limited total media spending in congressional races and the
percentage of media spending that could be used for radio and
television advertising. 20 Additionally, it significantly tightened
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862, Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 651).
" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-158, 159-167, 171-183, 185-187,
557 (1997)).
114 THAYER, supra note 29, at 73-74.
... ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 26-28.
116 JOHN GARDNER, IN COMMON CAUSE 33, 55 (1972).
"17 ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 388 (1960).
118 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1997).
"9 2 U.S.C. § 256 (1925) (repealed 1972).
120 Total media spending was limited to ten cents per eligible voter or
$50,000 per candidate, whichever was greater. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
supra note 95, at 87. Up to sixty percent of this amount could be used for radio
and television advertising. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 95, at
87.
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disclosure requirements, eliminating most of the pre-existing
loopholes in the law. Operating on the theory that disclosure
eliminates political quid pro quos, the Act abolished the old,
unenforced expenditure ceilings.' 2' The Act also sanctioned the
use of corporate and labor union revenues to set up and administer
political action committees, or PACs.'22
Then came the Watergate scandals of 1972 to 1974.23 The
1971 FECA had not made clear whether contributions made
between the last filing under the old Federal Corrupt Practices Act
and the effective date of FECA had to be disclosed. The Nixon
campaign refused to disclose contributions made during that period.
Finally forced to disclose these contributions in September 1973,
the Committee revealed it had received over $11 million during
that period - mostly in large contributions and much of it within
the last 48 hours before FECA took effect. 124 Eventually, it also
became apparent that at least $10 million in illegal corporate
contributions had been donated to the campaign before FECA and
that campaign monies had been used to both fund and cover up the
Watergate break-in.
25
Public reaction to news of Nixon's campaign finances and
expenditures was harsh. However, if these revelations proved
anything, it was only that good, enforceable disclosure laws, such
as those passed in 1971, would work. Had such laws been in place
121 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 95, at 39-40.
122 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 37.
123 The author uses the term "Watergate scandals" to refer to a crisis faced
by the federal government in the early 1970s. The crisis started with a break-in
at the Democractic Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C. and
quickly "snowballed" into a widespread cover-up involving the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), President Nixon and White House personnel. Ultimately,
impeachment proceedings begun in the House of Representatives against
President Nixon led to the only resignation of a President in the history of the
United States. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF
A CRISIS (1975) (describing in detail the events leading to President Nixon's
resignation).
124 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 31. These contributions included over $2
million from W. Clement Stone and $250,000 from Leon Hess, Chairman of the
Amerada-Hess Oil Company. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 21-22.
125 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 123, at 41-42.
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throughout the 1968-72 period, the illegal corporate contributions
and unsavory quid pro quo practices of the Nixon Administration
may never have occurred. If such practices did occur, they would
have been revealed earlier and undoubtedly been used against the
President in the 1972 campaign. But rather than revel in the
triumph of disclosure, reformers used the scandals to push for much
tighter restrictions on campaign financing. They succeeded with the
passage of major amendments to FECA in 1974.
In addition to the now familiar system of presidential campaign
financing, the 1974 FECA reforms would have limited persons to
spending $1,000 "relative to a clearly identified candidate."' 26
However, this was one of several provisions struck down in
Buckley v Valeo. 127 The Supreme Court recognized that this
vague provision would smother political discourse if not strictly
limited to words of support or opposition to election made "in
express terms.' ' 128 Even then, the proposed FECA amendments
would have limited such expenditures to just $1,000, meaning in
effect that no citizen could make any significant financial effort to
convince the public to support a candidate, even if done anony-
mously and independently of a candidate.
Save for the Court's decision, the bill would also have limited
the ability of candidates to spend money on their own behalf.129
Spending on House and Senate races would have been limited as
well, to amounts wholly inadequate for modem campaigning.'3"
126 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976). The 1974 amendments
also repealed the 1971 limits on media spending. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
supra note 123, at 44-45.
127 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
128 Id. at 44.
129 Id. at 51-54.
130 Id. at 54-55. The House of Representatives limit, for example, was set at
$75,000. Adjusted for inflation, this figure would be approximately $220,000
today, far below the amount needed to successfully challenge an incumbent
congressperson. See Smith, supra note 83, at 1066. Generally, the spending level
of a challenger is far more important in determining the outcome than either the
spending of an incumbent or the ratio between the two. Gary Jacobson, Money
and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections 1972-1982, 47 PUB. CHOICE
7 (1985); Gary Jacobson, The Effects of Electoral Campaign Spending in
Congressional Elections, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 469 (1978).
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In another important provision, the 1974 Amendments repealed the
old Hatch Act provision barring federal contractors from establish-
ing PACs. 3'
The 1974 FECA Amendments, as modified in Buckley, are the
basic framework for federal campaign finance laws today, with one
important exception. In 1979, Congress amended FECA to allow
parties to spend money, without limit, for such grassroots party
building activities as producing buttons, bumper stickers, brochures,
posters and yard signs and holding voter registration and get-out-
the-vote drives. 32
Thus, we have been working for the betterment of campaign
finance laws in this country for nearly 100 years. The first federal
effort to reform campaign finance was made in 1907 and the law
has subsequently been amended in 1910, 1911, 1925, 1939, 1940,
1943, 1947, 1971, 1974 and 1979. After nearly 100 years of trial
and error, the ultimate question remains: Will anything work?
III. CAN REFORM WORK?
He will not see his lady nor his children
in joy, crowding about him, home from sea;
The Seirenes will sing his mind away
on their sweet meadow lolling. There are bones
of dead men rotting in a pile beside them
and flayed skins shrivel around the spot. '33
A. The Effect of Past Efforts At Campaign Finance Reform
The effect of the 1971 and 1974 federal "reforms" and similar
widespread state "reform" of the 1970s was to turn political
campaigning into a heavily regulated industry. The results,
however, were not so pleasing as voters had been led to believe
they would be. Congressional and Presidential spending continued
131 ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 38.
132 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x),(xii), (9)(B)(xiii),(ix); see CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, supra note 95, at 50.
133 HOMER, supra note 1, at 210.
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to rise, despite public funding provisions and voluntary limits.'34
Special interests seemed to grow, rather than decline, in influence.
Incumbents increased their fundraising advantages over challengers
as incumbent re-election rates reached record highs. 135 Voter turn-
out continued to decline. 136 Public confidence in leaders contin-
ued to fall. 137 Meanwhile, ordinary citizens found themselves
hauled into court for distributing home-made political leaflets 131
and criticizing local officials for cost overruns. 39 Retirees with
no legal expertise found themselves in violation of federal law for
writing checks to support the political candidates of their
choice. 40 Individuals who joined professional groups in order to
get information on political issues found the flow of information
blocked by threats of litigation. 14 1 Indeed, litigation became a
major campaign tactic. 142
Despite these consequences of the reform laws, including the
infringement upon traditional political liberties, reformers continue
to call for additional regulation. They blame the failure of the
current laws on the Supreme Court's Buckley decision and its
progeny. 143 Yet, they have steadfastly opposed repealing or
134 ALEXANDER & CORRADO, supra note 52, at 21.
135 See Smith, supra note 83, at 1050-51, and citations therein.
136 PALDA, supra note 71, at 112, Table 10.
137 Trust in Government Rebounds Slightly, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE,
Sept. 22, 1996, at 19A (including a table that shows response to a Gallup Survey
on the question, "How much of the time do you think you can trust the
government in Washington to do what is right?" The table shows a decline in the
number of people answering "most of the time" from 47% in 1970, before
FECA, to 24% in 1996.).
138 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
139 Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
140 Sara Fritz & Dwight Morris, FederalElection PanelNot Enforcing Limit
on Campaign Donations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at Al (noting that "elderly
persons... with little grasp of the federal campaign laws," are among the most
common violators of FECA).
141 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Federal Elections
Comm'n, 69 F.3d 600, 602-03 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
142 STEPHANIE D. MOussALI, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE CASE FOR
DEREGULATION 9 (1990).
143 See David Orr, Close Loot Loopholes, CHI. TRB., Apr. 6, 1997, at C16
(calling the Buckley decision "misguided" and blaming it for "burden[ing] our
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amending the remaining portions of the FECA in order to rational-
ize the system. More generally, they have argued, the Herculean
labor of cleaning up campaign finance has only begun, if the
system seems to have failed, it is only because far more regulation
is needed.
B. Current Legislative Efforts
In February of 1997, Common Cause, a leading "reform"
group, announced plans to gain 1,776,000 signatures in support of
two highly regulatory bills pending in Congress, commonly referred
to as the McCain-Feingold'" and Shays-Meehan bills. 45 At the
same time, the sponsors of those bills began a series of high profile
appearances in an effort to "drum up" support. Newspaper editorial
boards, which have long backed campaign finance regulation, 146
have offered strong support for the measures.' 47 In 1997,
politics with a campaign fmance system that fosters public cynicism and
promotes the domination of campaigns by wealthy campaign contributors").
144 S. 25, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997). On October 7, 1997, the Senate failed
to close debate on the McCain-Feingold bill thus deferring any immediate change
to the current campaign finance system. See Editorial, Thunder in the Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A22.
145 H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997). See Common Cause press release
(March 20, 1997) <http://www.cc.org/publications/032097.htm>. The bills are
named for their primary sponsors, Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold, and
Representatives Christopher Shays and Marty Meehan. For a discussion of the
bills see infra notes 149-151, 161-63, 168 and accompanying text. The Common
Cause signature effort flopped and was quietly discontinued. John Marelius,
Awash in Cash: The Trouble with Campaign Finance, SAN DIEGO UNION &
TRIB., July 20, 1997, at Al.
146 SORAUF, supra note 53, at 26.
147 For example, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los
Angeles Times, arguably the most influential newspapers in the country, each ran
multiple editorials in just the first two and a half months of 1997, supporting the
McCain-Feingold legislation. Editorial, A Shot of Courage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1997, at A22; Editorial, Credibility Hill, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1997, at A12;
Editorial, In Campaign Reform Issue, One Word Stands Out: Now, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1997, at M4; Editorial, No Excuse on Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1997, at A14; Editorial, Reform in Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997,
§ 4, at 12; Editorial, The State of the Union, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1997, at A22;
THE SIRENS' SONG
Minority Leader in the House of Representatives, Richard
Gephardt, introduced a proposed amendment to the Constitution
which would authorize Congress and the states to impose "reason-
able regulations" on expenses and contributions intended to
"influence" the outcome of state and federal elections and ballot
initiatives. The proposed amendment included a provision authoriz-
ing Congress and the states to determine which expenditures are for
the purpose of "influencing elections." '148
Much of what is currently classified as "reform" is, in reality,
the same approach reformers have tried for years. For example, the
Shays-Meehan and McCain-Feingold bills would set spending limits
on campaigns,149 even though most observers agree that such
limits work to entrench incumbents in office. 5° Another favorite
idea is to lower the $1,000 individual contribution limit to amounts
Editorial, Too Little Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at A20.
14' H.R.J. Res. 47, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
149 In order to comport with Buckley, these limits are ostensibly "voluntary."
See 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976). However, they include punitive provisions-if
a candidate spends more than the "voluntary" limit, his or her opponent may
increase spending to match the non-complying candidate. S. 25, § 101(e); H.R.
493, § 101 (f). Additionally, the non-complying candidate's opponent is allowed
to accept larger contributions than the non-complying candidate. S. 25, § 101(f).
These contributions are twice as large in the Senate bill. S. 25, § 105. They are
eight times larger in the House of Representatives version. H.R. 493, §§ 104,
202. Section 202 of House Bill 493 limits the percentage of contributions that
can exceed $250 to just 25% of the total "voluntary" spending limit. H.R. 493,
§ 202. There is no exception for a non-complying candidate. H.R. 493, § 202.
Thus a candidate spending over the limit is restricted to receiving $250
contributions, while a complying candidate, in addition to having the spending
limit raised, may accept contributions up to $2,000 without limit. H.R. 493,
§ 202.
"0 See generally PALDA, supra note 71, at 48-50; Jacobson, supra note 130.
But see Donald Green & Jonathan Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift
Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections,
32 AM. J. POL. ScI. 884 (1988). The Shays-Meehan and McCain-Feingold bills
would establish spending thresholds at the very point where challengers become
competitive. Shays-Meehan uses a $600,000 figure for House of representatives
races: roughly forty percent of challengerswho spent more won, while only three
percent who spent less won. All 1994 and 1996 Senate challengers who spent
less than the limits in the McCain-Feingold bill lost, but all incumbents spending
less than those limits won.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
as low as $100."' These low limits favor incumbents,15 2
strengthen narrowly organized interests at the expense of broader
interests'53 and encourage interests to seek legislative influence,
rather than electoral results, and so work against the professed goals
of reformers. 54 Lowering the individual contribution limit also
requires candidates to increase the time spent fundraising which,
paradoxically, then becomes a justification for more regulation.'
Additionally, the abolition of PACs remains another goal,15
6
despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that PACs allow small
donors to band together to increase their political clout.
In addition to increasing the extent of these tried and failed
regulations, current reform efforts are aimed at closing a variety of
"loopholes" through which individuals have made political
contributions despite past efforts at reform. Currently, reformers are
targeting so-called "soft money," itself a part of the 1979 reforms
aimed at increasing grassroots activity. "Soft money" contributions,
unregulated by the FECA, are used for party activities such as voter
registration drives, get-out-the-vote drives, generic advertising and
slate cards.' 57 Reformers view soft money as a "loophole" that
allows both candidates and parties to circumvent spending and
contribution limits.5 8 They argue that it reintroduces quid pro
"' Section 202 of Shays-Meehan would limit most contributions to just
$250. H.R. 493 § 202. See also Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995)
(striking down $300 limit on contributions), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996);
Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (striking down $100 limit on
contributions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995); National Black Police Ass'n
v. D. C. Bd. of Elections, 924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996) (striking down $200
limit on contributions).
152 Smith, supra note 83, at 1072-73.
153 THOMAS GAIs, IMPROPER INFLUENCE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW,
POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY 173-74 (1996).
' Smith, supra note 83, at 1075-76.
'" See, e.g., STERN, supra note 22, at 3; Vincent Blasi, Spending Limits and
the Squandering of Candidates' Time, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 123 (1997).
156 See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 201 (1997) (banning PACs).
' ALEXANDER & CORRADO, supra note 52, at 147-48.
118 Reformers are particularly upset that, in the 1996 election, "soft money"
was used for issue advertisements which had the effect of supporting or opposing
candidates for federal office. See Donald J. Simon, Untitled Manuscript, J.
LEGIS. (forthcoming 1998). A defense of "soft money" and a critique of efforts
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quo political corruption for candidates and works against equality
by allowing wealthy individuals, corporations and unions to
contribute large amounts.'59
An additional "loophole" that reformers now seek to "plug" is
the expenditure of funds on "issue advocacy," that is, political
discourse that does not expressly support or oppose a candidate, but
still has the potential to influence voters. 60 Proposals to limit
"issue advocacy" speech are, most likely, the greatest threat to the
liberty of all campaign finance regulation because virtually all
political discourse is carried on in the hopes of eventually electing
or defeating candidates. The Shays-Meehan proposal, for example,
would allow the FEC to limit speech:
made for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat
of the candidate, as shown by one or more factors, such as
a statement or action by the person making the communi-
cation, the targeting or placement of the communication, or
the use by the person making the communication of
polling, demographic, or other similar data relating to the
candidate's campaign or election. 61
Shays-Meehan is activated to limit such speech when the
speaker spends in excess of $1,000,162 an amount so low that it
would all but end organized speech about political candidates by
citizens or groups of citizens outside of the candidate's campaign.
Again, the fear of such speech is that it provides an outlet for large
donors and interests to end-run spending and contribution limits.
Thus, it must be regulated and, if possible, shut off. In a similar
vein, reformers seek to stop "independent expenditures" that are
to ban it can be found in Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The
Political and Constitutional Case Against A Soft Money Ban, J. LEGIS.
(forthcoming 1998).
"9 ALEXANDER & CORRADO, supra note 52, at 111-13; LISA ROSENBERG,
A BAG OF TRICKS, LOOPHOLES IN THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM 3-6 (1996).
160 ROSENBERG, supra note 159, at 7-8.
161 See H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 251(b) (1997). For a critique of the
constitutionality of this proposal, see Hearings on Issue Advocacy Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1997) (statements of James Bopp and Bradley A. Smith).
162 H.R. 493, § 254.
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subject to federal contribution and reporting restrictions but, under
Buckley, cannot be limited in amount. Essentially, Shays-Meehan
seeks to limit such expenditures in two ways: first, by penalizing
them to such an extent that they are rendered ineffective and
second, by burdening the spender with excessive reporting
requirements, including advance notice of the speech.'63
These efforts to restrict soft money, issue advocacy and
independent expenditures are alarming not only because of the
burden that the they place on First Amendment rights, but because
they flow so naturally from the assumptions and goals underlying
campaign finance regulatory efforts. In fact, in the 1996 campaigns,
both parties used soft money not only for traditional party building
activities, but also to run advertisements that, to the average viewer,
must certainly have appeared to be advertisements run by candi-
dates Clinton and Dole.164
Similarly, over the last two election cycles, a variety of groups
on both the "left" and "right" have learned how to produce "issue
advocacy" advertisements which are thinly veiled assaults on
political opponents. In 1996, the most prominent of these was
organized labor's $35 million advertising campaign which aimed to
"bury" the Republicans' "Contract with America.' 165
Additionally, the Sierra Club, Citizen Action, National Abortion
Rights Action League, Christian Coalition and various other groups
also ran "issue advocacy" advertisements which seemed to target
political opponents. 66 If one is attempting to prevent the possibility
of quid pro quo trading or to equalize political participation, such
163 See id.
364 See Adam Clymer, System Governing Election Spending Found in
Shambles, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1996, at Al (stating that both parties ran issue
advertisementswith "theirpresidential candidates' faces dominating the television
screen" and quoting Republican candidate Bob Dole, as saying "It never says that
I'm running for President, though I hope that's fairly obvious, since I'm the only
one in the picture."); Alison Mitchell, Building a Bulging War Chest: How
Clinton Financed His Run, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at Al (describing
collaboration between President Clinton and the Democratic National Committee
to run advertisements featuring the President and his positions on issues and
noting that President Clinton helped to edit scripts).
165 ROSENBERG, supra note 159, at 9.
166 ROSENBERG, supra note 159, at 9.
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speech presents a danger. It upsets the carefully established
monetary equality and leaves open the possibility of corruption. But
is such regulation consistent with free speech?
In Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized that a bright line had
to be drawn if such regulation was not to have a chilling effect on
speech. Therefore, it limited regulation of non-candidate speech to
advertisements involving such phrases as "elect," "defeat" and
"support."' 67 The vague definition of issue advocacy speech to be
regulated under the Shays-Meehan bill, 168 fails to draw the
Buckley bright line and instead, opens up virtually all political
speech mentioning a candidate to government regulation. To
distinguish, regulators will be required to probe past actions and
comments by the speaker in an effort to determine the speaker's
true motivation. This will have a chilling effect on speech and will
further take political debates out of the electoral arena and into the
courts.
However, even if the regulations could be narrowly drawn so
as to catch only strongly suggestive advertisements, such as the
1996 AFL-CIO campaign, and an adequate bright line test could be
established, would the solution be adequate to meet the reformers
demands? It is absurd to think that private actors will ignore rents
made available to them by government action.169 It is even more
absurd to think that individuals or interests will allow the govern-
ment to tax or regulate them, sometimes to the point of economic
extinction, without attempting to influence who holds the reins of
power. Thus, if the most egregiously partisan "issue" advertise-
ments were banned, money would most likely flow into other
means of affecting elections. This might mean only slightly less
obvious issue advertisements. Would these be banned as well?
Large membership organizations, such as unions, the National Rifle
Association or the American Association of Retired Persons, might
step up highly partisan membership communications, making sure
that excess copies are available and are left at strategic locations.
167 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44, 44 n.52 (1976).
16' H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 251(b) (1997).
169 See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
OF ECON. & MGMT. Scd. 3 (1971).
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Outright, old-fashioned bribery might return as businesses seek to
protect their interests. We might see an increase in the publication
of anonymous campaign literature, which some feel is more
scurrilous and less accountable than other types of publications.
Another possibility is a return to the purchase or subsidy of partisan
newspapers, radio and television stations. Would it then become
necessary to censor these media outlets? The ingenuity of those
seeking to influence political outcomes knows few bounds and,
given the power wielded by government, an incentive will exist to
find the inevitable "loopholes.""17
C. The Next Wave of Reform: The Law Reviews
Although proposals such as the Shays-Meehan and McCain-
Feingold bills seem comprehensive, it is apparent that they will fall
short of achieving their goals. When they do, we can expect that a
new wave of legislation, aiming to close "loopholes," will follow.
Indeed, law reviews are already brimming with ideas to further
regulate political speech.
One currently "hot" idea in academia is to limit all campaign
spending, except for a small amount made available to each voter
through a government issued voucher.'71 For example, under a
proposal advanced by Professor Richard Hasen, each voter would
receive a $100 voucher from the government; no other monetary or
in-kind contributions could be expended to influence federal
elections. Nor could vouchers be supplemented from private
funds.172 Interest groups could collect vouchers in order to make
independent expenditures in support of candidates. However, in
order to monitor the system and prevent fraud, these interest groups
170 For an enlightening look at the creative ways in which campaign laws are
evaded, see SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 39-40, 53-55, 328-29.
171 See generally Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning
for Campaign Finance, 13 AM. PROSPECT 71 (1993); Foley, supra note 24;
Hasen, supra note 27 (discussing government issued vouchers); Jeremy Paul,
Campaign Reform in the 21st Century: Putting Money Where Mouth Is, U.
CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997) (calling Ackerman's proposal the "best I
have seen").
172 Hasen, supra note 27, at 23.
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would be licensed by the federal government. 7 3 Professor Hasen
does specify that licensing decisions may not be based on political
grounds. However, given the history of abuse of the IRS and other
government agencies in harassing political opponents,'74 his
sanguinity may be misplaced.
Even if it is possible to have what election law attorney Jan
Baran has dubbed a "benign political police,"'75 Professor
Hasen's proposal, as comprehensive as it seems, would not
necessarily satisfy reformers. For example, Hasen does not deal
with the question of "issue advocacy" which perturbs the current
wave of reformers.'76 That such a thorough proposal as Professor
Hasen's is likely to fail to satisfy reformers indicates just how
dangerous it is to tread down the regulatory path where political
speech is involved. Further, even if Hasen's proposal were
modified to include a broad, intrusive, Shays-Meehan type
definition of expenditures "in support of or in opposition to a
candidate," it would probably fall short of reformers' goals because
Hasen excludes from his proposal political advocacy related to
173 Hasen, supra note 27, at 22-23.
174 See, e.g., Elizabeth McDonald, The Kennedys and the IRS, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 1997, at A16 (describing the Kennedy administration's use of the IRS
to harass opponents); Robert Norton Smith, Please Stop Thinking About
Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, § 4, at 15 (describing Franklin
Roosevelt's use of the FBI to pressure newspaper editors). President Kennedy
also sought to use the FCC to harass conservative commentators, including the
Red Lion Broadcasting Company. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969). President Nixon used not only the IRS to harass opponents but also
the FBI and the CIA. See, e.g, SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 311, 403
n.3; Tim Weiner, Historian Wins Long Battle to Hear More Nixon Tapes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at A12. President Clinton may also have abused both the
FBI and the IRS for political purposes, according to some reports. See, e.g., Neil
A. Lewis, Whitewater Counsel Examining Use of FBI to Get GOP Files, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1996, at Al; Rowan Scarborough, NRA Won't Release Members
Names: IRS Demands Confidential List, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A4
(noting a suspiciously high number of audits since 1994 of conservative political
groups critical of President Clinton).
175 See SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 327.
176 Hasen, supra note 27, at 23 (noting that "[p]olitical activity not directly
endorsing or opposing a candidate would not be subject to any limits" and
indicating that he would allow most, if not all, "issue advocacy").
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ballot issues. 17 7 Ballot issues are already a common means by which
individuals seek to build support for a current or future candi-
dacy.' With other forms of financial participation shut off, it is
likely that ballot initiatives will be used more explicitly to promote
candidacies by featuring candidates in advertisements, unless this
too were precluded by a broad definition of issue advocacy.
Therefore, for example, if a popular governor running for United
States Senator were to oppose a state constitutional amendment,
advertisements by groups opposing the amendment would likely be
barred from featuring, or even mentioning, the governor's opposi-
tion. 179
Furthermore, if the aim of reform is equality, why should
restrictions not also be levied on ballot issues? If inequality of
wealth "distorts" the election of candidates, thereby indirectly
"distorting" the laws that are passed, should the application of
wealth to politics not also be banned where it directly "distorts"
17 Hasen, supra note 27, at 23. However, Hasen would include ballot issues
in his proposal if it was extended to state elections. Hasen, supra note 27, at 23
n.99.
1' For example, in the 1970s, a Michigan insurance executive, Richard
Headlee, achieved political prominence in the state through his authorship and
promotion of a state tax limitation measure. See Susanna McBee, Prop 13
Spawns Tax-Curbs Votes on 16 State Ballots, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1978, at A4.
In 1982, Headlee was the Republican nominee for governor. Established
politicians can also use the tactic: California Governor Pete Wilson used his
support for initiatives limiting affirmative action and public benefits to
immigrants to boost his political fortunes. See Paul West, Anti-Alien Rhetoric a
Nationwide Hit: GOP Candidiates Make Points Mining Resentment Against
Immigrants-Even from the Border, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 3, 1995,
at A1O.
179 For example, in 1996, Ohio Governor George Voinovich took a high
profile role in opposition to a state constitutional amendment to allow gambling
in the state. See Brent Larkin, Five Sure Bets Not So Sure, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 20, 1996, at 1C. Had he also been a candidate for federal office--or even
reelection, if the same principles are applied to state election-advertisements
by gambling opponents featuring the Governor would quite likely be deemed a
contribution to his campaign. In fact, Governor Voinovich, though not yet an
officially declared candidate, made clear before the 1996 elections that he will
run for the United States Senate in 1998. See Joe Hallett, Voinovich Defends Not
Appearing With Dole, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 12, 1996, at IA.
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laws and governance? It is for this very reason that another voucher
proponent, Professor Edward Foley, argues that ballot issues should
be included in any voucher scheme. 8 ' Like Hasen, Foley does
not specifically state what he would do with "issue ads" that have
the potential to affect elections. However, one might glean from his
general thesis and his inclusion of ballot issues that these advertise-
ments would also have to be limited."18
Even if a voucher program were applied to limit political
communication involving candidates, ballot issues and issue
advocacy, this would still not satisfy reformers. The issue of
internal communications would remain. Groups with large
memberships, such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored Persons, the National Rifle Association,
the American Association of Retired Persons, Christian Coalition
and labor unions, could still have "undue influence" through their
ability to spend large sums on member education and
endorsements-some of which would almost surely leak into the
general populace. 82 This too, we find is an ultimate concern of
reformers.
For example, in the 1994 elections the United States Chamber
of Commerce and the American Medical Association were
threatened with prosecution if they published endorsements to
thousands of their dues-paying members-many of whom joined
"0 Foley, supra note 24, at 1249.
1.. Foley, supra note 24, at 1249-50.
182 I leave aside here such extreme cases as a large group such as the
American Association of Retired Persons using television to communicate with
its members. Membership magazines and literature are easily put into the general
public. Suppose, for example, that a group such as the League of Women Voters
or American Association of Retired Persons urged its members to provide free
copies of group literature to libraries, hotels and physician waiting rooms, or to
abandon copies on buses, subways, and airplanes? Even if the casual laying
around of literature might not be viewed as a problem, would an organized
campaign to leave literature laying about in this fashion create a violation of the
law? Or suppose the organization made it easy to download its publications from
the Internet, and encouraged members to download and then post its literature to
Internet sites and discussion groups? Would that violate the law? If not, would
not candidates still seek out such endorsements as having special value? Would
not that be "undue influence?"
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precisely to get such information. 83 Newspapers and other media
present another "thorny" problem. If all other avenues of financial
participation are sealed, might not groups and individuals purchase
media outlets for the sole purpose of promoting a partisan view,
candidate or group of candidates? Hasen admits that this is a "large
loophole,"' 84 but would allow this because "newspapers and other
news media are a valuable source of information for the public,"
and "help people overcome collective action problems in acquiring
information, a classic public good."' 85 Of course, the same is true
of party, candidate and issue group advertising, 86 so the excep-
tion does not really add up. Foley recognizes this situation and
therefore, includes newspaper editorials within the limits of his
system. 187 Newspapers would have to "pay" with vouchers
collected from the electorate to run their own editorials. However,
this proposal overlooks the fact that the central purpose of
newspaper editorials is to persuade, not merely reflect views
already held by the citizenry.
But would even this Draconian provision satisfy the reformist
goals of equality and preventing corruption? I think not. 88 For
example, the primary complaints one hears about media influence
do not refer to editorials, but to the slant of news coverage. 89
183 United States Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 602-03 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
184 Hasen, supra note 27, at 25 n. 11.
..5 Hasen, supra note 27, at 26.
186 See PALDA, supra note 71, at 31-32 (campaign advertising increases
voter's knowledge of both the issues and the candidates, with message repetition
being an important part of that effort (citing Jean Crete, Television, Advertising
and Canadian Elections, in MEDIA AND VOTERS IN CANADIAN ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS 3 (Frederick J. Fletchered., 1991)); BeVier, supra note 88, at 1274-
75 (commenting on the role of interest groups in overcoming collective action
problems).
..7 Foley, supra note 24, at 1252.
188 See Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to
Contradiction, 83 MICH. L. REv. 939, 946-48 (1985).
189 See, e.g., Michael Wines, The Presidential Race: Pools and Stars, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at B7 (describing allegations of media bias by Media
Research Center). See also William Claberson, Increasingly, Reporters Say
They're Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at A20 (stating that news
reporters are more likely to vote democratic than the general populace and that
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Foley suggests that "[i]t will be difficult at times to tell whether
what a newspaper has written is merely reporting the facts relating
to an electoral race or, instead, is a thinly disguised attempt to
persuade voters to support or oppose a particular candidate."' 90
The author suggests that it is not only difficult, but in most cases,
impossible. Foley calls the potential chilling effects of such
regulation "the necessary price we must pay in order to have an
electoral system that guarantees equal opportunity for all."'191
Perhaps Professor Foley's greatest contribution to the debate is to
show how high that price might be.
In considering further regulation and "loopholes" that will need
to be closed, I do not suggest that all reformers are hopelessly
trapped on a slippery slope. For example, Hasen, unlike Foley,
would not include newspapers in his scheme. Many reformers may
wish to ban "soft money," but remain squeamish about attempts to
redefine "issue advocacy" for precisely the types of reasons I have
suggested. But, I do emphasize the quixotic nature of efforts to
purify politics or equalize influence through the campaign finance
system. There will always be "loopholes." If rent seeking is
unavoidable under a powerful, activist state; if equal "political
influence" is both a flawed and unattainable goal; and if reform
measures have both failed in the past and seem unlikely to
accomplish their goals in the future, we must ask if the freedoms
already sacrificed are worth the gain and how far down the slope
we will go in pursuit of an unattainable goal.
The potential for corruption will exist so long as the state
retains tremendous power, not only over wealth, but also over
personal decisions, such as the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, or
drugs, the ownership of guns and the regulation of pornography.
The potential for corruption will exist because the incentive to
corrupt will exist. This does not mean that we must live in a
libertarian state. There may be other goals besides reducing rent-
seeking or maximizing economic efficiency, and it may be that we
this may skew selection of and reporting on issues); Levinson, supra note 188,
at 947.
190 Foley, supra note 24, at 1252. Perhaps an even greater problem is a
"well-disguised" effort to persuade voters to support or oppose a candidate.
191 Foley, supra note 24, at 1253.
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would sacrifice economic growth and property rights to achieve
those goals.1 92 But we do need to recognize the trade-off. One
price of an activist state is that people will attempt to turn power
towards their own ends. 93 In a futile effort to prevent rent
seeking, reformers suggest that we should sacrifice our liberty of
speech and political action, as well.194
Egalitarian reformers also seek to promote a type of political
equality at the expense of liberty. They hold forth the dream of a
world in which all people have "equal" influence, or at least the
opportunity for equal participation. Yet, reaching that utopia is
always, it seems, one more campaign finance "loophole" away.
Some, such as Professors Fiss and Dworkin,'95 respond that they
are not taking away freedom, but granting it. Dworkin argues that
political practices must "treat all members of the community as
individuals, with equal concern and respect,' ' 96 and that this
requires restrictions on political participation through campaign
giving."9  But this merely begs the question: are all individuals
treated with equal concern and respect when they are not allowed
to equally employ the fruits of their labors and talents to political
action?9"
Although Professor Fiss' argument does not beg such questions,
it is even more disturbing. Fiss argues that "we may sometimes
find it necessary to restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others, and that
unless the Court allows, and sometimes even requires, the state to
192 Hasen, supra note 27, at 15-16. Nor were the Founders of this country
blind to the problem of rent seeking, even in the minimalist state which existed
at the time. Madison's Federalist No. 10 is largely concerned with how the
Constitution seeks to prevent rent-seeking through federalism, separation of
powers, and the size of the union. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
' BeVier, supra note 88, at 1276.
194 BeVier, supra note 88, at 1279.
95 Professor Owen M. Fiss, Sterling Professor, Yale Law School; L.L.B.,
Harvard Law School. Professor Ronald M. Dworkin, New York University
School of Law; L.L.B., Harvard Law School.
196 RONALD DwoRKiN, FREEDOM'S LAW 17 (1996).
197 Id. at 18; see also Ronald Dworkin, The Curse ofAmerican Politics, NEW
YoRK REv., Oct. 17, 1996, at 19.
198 Smith, supra note 83, at 1079-81.
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do so, we as a people will never truly be free."'" It is impossi-
ble, in the context of this paper, to address the seriously flawed
premises of Professors Dworkin and Fiss.2" ° But as Fiss makes
clear, what he considers "freedom" is not freedom as it has
historically been accepted in the United States; his is not the
historic interpretation of the First Amendment.01
CONCLUSION: WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Steer wide;
keep well to seaward; plug your oarsmen's ears
with beeswax kneaded soft; none of the rest
should hear that song
But if you wish to listen
let the men tie you in the lugger, hand
and foot, back to the mast, lashed to the mast,
so you may hear those harpies' thrilling voices;
shout as you will, begging to be untied,
your crew must only twist more line around you.. 2 o2
199 Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405,
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GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
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• . ."). See also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A
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I have argued elsewhere that efforts to regulate campaign
finance have, for the most part, had deleterious effects for our
democracy.203 In particular, they are anti-egalitarian, as
Americans have traditionally understood the concept of political
equality, and, in some ways, they actually increase the amount and
success of influence seeking. Whatever the actual effects of such
efforts, it should be clear that they do infringe on our First
Amendment freedoms.
Since 1907, federal election law has been amended eleven
times, with at least four major overhauls in 1907, 1925, 1971 and
1974.2° When laws become complicated and difficult to follow,
as the Federal Elections Campaign Act certainly is, even without
such complex proposals as are included in current "reform" bills;
when they fail to achieve their desired goals; and when they are in
constant need of revision to plug an ever evolving series of
"loopholes," one must consider the possibility that it is the laws,
and not the people, which are flawed.20 5
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... 206
Historically, fights over the First Amendment have focused on the
extent to which this language protects commercial speech, porno-
graphy, hate speech or fighting words. Few have suggested that it
does not or should not cover political speech. Yet, political speech
is precisely what campaign finance reforms seek to regulate, with
ever increasing scope and vigor.
Proponents of campaign finance reform are like the Sirens that
so bewitched unwary sailors in Homer's Odyssey.2 7 Their music
is sweet-political equality, the end to corruption and scandal, and
the prevention of "nasty" campaign tactics all rolled into one. But
the promise is not fulfilled, and the ongoing quest brings with it a
very high price. As a result of our past reforms, campaigns often
turn as much on legal issues, the complexities of finance law and
203 Smith, supra note 83, at 1071-72.
204 See infra Part II.C (discussing past efforts of reform).
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 381 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
206 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
207 HoMER, supra note 1, at 211.
THE SIRENS' SONG
the skills of lawyers and consultants, as on appeals to voters.
Incumbents are unfairly entrenched in office. Office holders are
forced to spend an inordinate amount of time raising money. More
importantly, true grassroots efforts are being smothered by
bureaucracy, and citizens are being both silenced and deprived of
information which they deserve, and ought, to have. We are told
that all of these wrongs may be corrected, if only we give up more
of our right to participate in political activity. The problem with
this "trust me" approach is that there will always be another
"loophole" to plug.
In the Odyssey, Lady Kirke warns Odysseus to ignore the
Sirens' call. He must be "lashed to the mast" to resist their
temptations: and if tempted to give in, his crew "must only twist
more line" around him, "till the singers fade."2 8
For two hundred years, the First Amendment has served as the
mast to which we are lashed, restraining our worst impulses to
silence the speech we do not like or find in some way dangerous.
Campaign reformers are like the Sirens, singing sweet music. They
call us to their shores; the solution, they tell us, is to head closer
still to their song, and to close the next set of "loopholes."
And this is where we stand at the moment. We need to make
a choice. Will we plug our ears to the sirens, and bind ourselves
tight to the First Amendment mast; or will we continue toward the
sound, risking some of our most precious liberties?
208 HOMER, supra note 1, at 211.

